Shahad A. B. The Philosophy and Causes of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988(

Abstract

This research examines the philosophical roots and strategic dimensions of the first Gulf War (1980-1988) from an analytical perspective that focuses on the vision of the Iraqi and Arab military elites. In this context, the philosophy of war is understood as an inevitable conflict arising from the intersection of geopolitical ambitions and ideological clashes. The Iraqi military elite considered it a “preemptive defensive war” aimed at protecting national sovereignty and repelling the “export of revolution” project that threatened to undermine the stability of the state.

On the other hand, the research analyzes the vision of Arab military elites who adapted the conflict within the concept of “Arab national security,” considering Iraq an impenetrable barrier to Iranian regional expansion, despite their differing assessments of the strategic cost of prolonging the confrontation. The study concludes that the Arab military mind framed the war as an existential necessity to consolidate the balance of power and prevent the geopolitical imbalance of the region, making the military philosophy of this war a mixture of nationalist doctrine and political realism based on deterrence and the protection of the political entity from cross-border threats.