Marwa A. M. The Volitional Basis of Criminal Behavior and its Contingencies

Abstract

In criminal law, it is not sufficient for the perpetrator to merely perform a physical, bodily act for such conduct to be deemed criminal and produce legal consequences. The legal value of the act is realized only when it is the result of a free and conscious will. Although bodily movement represents the external manifestation of behavior, its mere occurrence is not enough unless it is carried out with awareness and understanding, based on an internal will directed toward the act itself and its outcome. Will, in this context, is not simply an additional component, but rather the essential expression of the psychological dimension of the act. It is what confers legal legitimacy upon the act in terms of legal classification.

Accordingly, criminal behavior as one of the fundamental elements of a crime can only exist through the conjunction of two essential components: the bodily movement, as the material and external aspect of the act, and the volitional origin of that movement, which grants it its legal character and renders it subject to criminal liability. If this volitional origin is absent, or if the psychological link between the will and the movement is disrupted, then the event cannot be considered criminal behavior, and consequently, no crime can be said to have occurred. This is because will plays two essential roles in the formation of behavior: first, it acts as the causal source of the bodily movement whether it involves an action or omission and second, it directs and controls that movement in a manner consistent with the course intended by the actor, whether that intention reflects deliberate purpose or negligence, in the case of non-intentional crimes.

However, despite the central importance of volition in the formation of criminal behavior, it may be subject to exceptional contingencies that interfere either at the moment the will is formed or during its translation into action. This may lead to the absence of will, even though the physical movement is materially present. In such cases, the movement may appear to have been performed by the perpetrator, but in reality, it is devoid of will, meaning that behavior, in the legal sense, is lacking, and thus the crime itself is negated at its very foundation.