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Mazen Mezher Awad mazinmzher@uokirkuk.edu.iq


Abstract

Budget laws are classified as one of the joint actions between the executive and legislative authorities that cannot see the light without their cooperation and support, and as long as the budget is a speculative work of art that may be inaccurate predictions, especially since it is subject to the limited capabilities of human beings in anticipating the future and anticipating optimism and pessimism. In reviewing the government’s estimates of government spending in order to achieve the goals of parliamentary oversight as it represents the nation, and the authority to transfer part of those estimates from one program to another, this is what is termed “parliamentary transfer of budget estimates.” Reducing parliamentary indulgence in turning budget estimates upside down. This is as the constitution and the ordinary legislator granted greater privilege to the government and it is in the process of implementing the will of the legislator in the general budget law after it becomes enforceable. Decisions to reach important decisions that affect the essential needs of individuals, which is to amend the allocations and appropriations of the general budget (transfer from one expenditure side to another) on the pretext of achieving the public interest or to avoid harm to the public interest. The ultimate goal of the public interest is to impose restrictions on the authority of the state’s public treasury to take its decision on a deliberate study. From the concept of violation, skipping over these restrictions is a demolition of the principles of government spending and circumventing the contents of the parliamentary leave of the public budget.


These restrictions constitute “brakes” that limit the legislator’s rush to use his financial powers during the consideration of the draft budget law or the executive authority’s infringement of its powers during the preparation of the draft budget, and the judiciary of the Federal Supreme Court also had an important role in maintaining the commitment of the legislative authority or the executive authority to the limits of its constitutional powers. Note that the study was divided into two sections preceded by an introduction and followed by a conclusion.

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How to Cite
Mezher Awad م. (2023). Budget recustomize between constitutional constraints and discretion. Al-Kitab Journal for Human Sciences, 8(5), 291–321. Retrieved from https://isnra.net/ojs/index.php/KJHS/article/view/772